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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970
INTRODUCTION
The Impact of Organized Crime on American Society
Today, organized crime has deeply penetrated broad segments of Ameri-
can life .... [T]he organized criminal relies on physical terror and psy-
chological intimidation, on economic retaliation and political bribery, on
citizen indifference and governmental acquiescence. He corrupts our
governing institutions and subverts our democratic processes. For him, the
moral and legal subversion of our society is a life-long and lucrative
profession.1
Organized crime, like a giant spider web of illicit activity, criss-crosses
the nation intricately carving out criminal satrapies at the expense of all
legitimate enterprise. Its overt illegal operations in the areas of gambling
and narcotics reveal but the top of the iceberg in comparison to organized
crime's far-reaching effect into legitimate areas of economic, social, and
political concern.2 Organized criminal activity, though, is an illusory con-
cept. The difficulties that law enforcement agencies and legislators have
had in attempting to distinguish organized crime from other manifesta-
tions of crime (or for that matter from every other citizen who comes into
contact with the law) have contributed to the frustrations of those groups
attempting to combat organized crime and to the vitality of the crime syndi-
cate.a If the phenomenon of organized crime can be described at all, it
must be defined as a loosely connected group of regional criminal cartels
that monopolize criminal enterprises in that region, not as a collection of
specific illegal ventures but as a continuous plan of long-term illegal ac-
tivity.4
'President Richard Nixon's message relative to the fight against organized crime in the
Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 444 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. In
1966, former President Johnson initiated the intense study of organized crime by observing in
his "Special Message on Crime":
The most flagrant manifestation of crime in America is organized crime. It erodes our
very system of justice.... It is intolerable that corporations of corruption should sys-
tematically flaunt our laws.
112 CONG. REC. 5146 (daily ed. March 6, 1966).
2 See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMIssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 187-91 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY]. Wilson, The Threat
of Organized Crime: Highlighting the Challenging New Frontier in Criminal Law, 46 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 41, 42 (1970). [hereinafter cited as Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime].
3 Senate Hearings at 240. The longevity of organized crime can also be attributed to the
flexibility of its operation, being able to swiftly and efficiently alter emphasis as economic con-
ditions change or as legal attacks become close. Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime,
supra note 2.
4 Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime, supra note 2. For an excellent account of the
crime syndicate's organization, see THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoCIETY 191-96
(1967).
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The great strength of organized crime lies in its ability to insulate itself
from the operation of law enforcement and thereby evade the legal pro-
cess.' The organization uses its great wealth to influence and infiltrate legit-
imate business, making the apprehension and punishment of the leaders of
the illegal enterprises most difficult.6 Furthermore, it uses its great finan-
cial empire to corrupt local political and law enforcement officials who in
return allow organized criminal activity to flourish in their locales.' These
factors result in probably the greatest threat of organized crime--the intol-
erable degree of immunity from legal accountability that creates a demor-
alizing effect upon the citizens of the country, especially in the urban cen-
ters where lawlessness seems to be rewarded, and attacks the integrity and
credibility of the legal system.8
Law enforcement's ability to deal with organized crime has been com-
parable to attempts to extinguish a forest fire with a garden hose. How-
ever, it is generally recognized that substantive criminal law applicable to
organized crime activity is adequate.' The problems that law enforcement
agencies face in combating organized crime include three areas: (1) de-
fects in the way that evidence is gathered, resulting in the acquittal of many
professional criminals for lack of evidence; (2) lack of nationwide coordi-
nation among the different levels of government in the law enforcement
area; and (3) lack of adequate resources (financial) to devote to breaking
the power of organized crime.10 Paramount among these considerations is
the difficulty in gathering evidence against the power of a professional
criminal organization which efficiently conceals its illegal activities from the
"primitive" investigative methods of law enforcement. The Congress, per-
ceiving the need for some sort of legislation to enable law enforcement
to meet the challenge of organized crime in the United States, enacted the
"Organized Crime Control Act of 1970" with the expressed purposes to
strengthen the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, to establish
new penal prohibitions, and to provide enhanced sanctions and new rem-
edies to deal with the unlawful activities of professional criminals."
5 Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime, supra note 2, at 44.
0 For examples of racketeers operating legitimate businesses against the public interest, see
Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 433-36 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
7 THE PRESIDENT'S Co. missION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TtcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIzED CRIME 6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as T F R ON
ORGANIZED CRIME].
8 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liber-
ties?, 46 NORE DAME LAW. 55, 60 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McClellan, The Organized
Crime Act]; Wilson, The Threat of Organized Crime, supra note 2, at 43.
1) Blakey, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Preliminary
Analysis, T F R ON ORGANIZED CRIME, Appendix C 80, 81 (1967); See also Senate Hearings
112 (1969). The additional criminal prohibitions created by the Act are more in the way of
attempts to provide greater sanctions for organized criminal activity, See Titles VIII, IX, X, in!ra.
10T F R ON ORGANizE CmE 14-16 (1967).
11 84 STAT. 922 codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C. [hereinafter cited to U.S.C.A.].
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General Comments on the "Organized Crime Control Act of 1970'Y12
The Organized Crime Control Act represents a "conglomerate" of bills
introduced in Congress to facilitate the assault upon syndicated crime.13
With the exception of Title XII (The National Commission on Individual
Rights) and Title XI (Regulation of Explosives), which could tangentially
be connected to organized crime's enforcement methods, the other ten titles
of the Act systematically attempt to strengthen law enforcment's ability
to combat the criminal establishment by attacking the crime syndicate's
major sources of power and capacity to evade the legal process.14 Such a
broad and extensive treatment of the vast and complicated problem of or-
ganized crime is undoubtedly warranted. But the sweeping scope of the
remedies gives rise to a series of criticisms aimed at the Act's effects on
legitimate activity.
The basic criticism leveled at the Act as a whole is that it goes beyond
the scope of attacking the phenomenon of organized crime and into areas
that either were not intended to be affected or should not be affected by
the stringent measures of the Act.15 It is argued that a "shotgun" approach
denotes hasty legislative action toward a very complicated group of legal
problems.'0 Possibly the source of this lack of specification comes from
the failure of Congress to create a functional definition of organized crime
to guide the various facets of the Act. This omission may reflect the com-
plexity of delineating the various manifestations of organized crime into a
succinct definition. But the lack of a definition contributes to the problem
12 The scope of this note deals primarily with the constitutional issues raised by selected
Tides of this Act. Other considerations of policy and other non-constitutional arguments will
be discussed either in conjunction with certain constitutional questions or not at all.
1 3 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 8, at 57. The structure of many of the
Titles of the Act follows closely the recommendations of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE So-
ciETY 200-09 (1967).
14 The first seven Tides of the Act focus on remedying some of the difficulties in the evidence
gathering process by authorizing special grand juries to investigate and to issue reports on or-
ganized crime's activity (Tide I); by providing a general federal immunity statute for witnesses
(Title II); by dealing with witnesses who refuse to testify (Tide IH); by punishing witnesses
who knowingly make false declarations (Tide IV); by protecting government witnesses from
intimidation by organized crime (Tide V); by allowing depositions of witnesses to be taken by
the government and used in court (Title VI); and by providing special procedures when litiga-
tion arises concerning sources of evidence (Tide VII). Title VIII includes provisions to deal
with interstate gambling syndicates-organized crime's greatest source of revenue. Title IX
represents an imaginative approach to racketeering influence and the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime. Title X deals with increased sentences for the habitual or danger-
ous offender and the professional criminal.
15 AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE PROPOsED ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL AcT OF 1969 (S. 30) 5-8, May 12, 1970 [hereinafter cited as A B, C N Y
REPORT]; 116 CoNG. REc. S422 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1970) (ACLU Letter on S. 30 to tthe Sen-
ate); Dissenting View of Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan, H.L REP. No. 1549,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
16 The argument of overbreadth in legislative drafting, especially in the criminal area, has
constitutional overtones. The constitutional arguments with regard to the vagueness issue will
be explored in the discussion of the separate Titles when appropriate.
of overinclusive applicability in the Act because it is not dearly known to
what exact conduct the legislative scheme of the Act is directed. Further-
more, a congressional formulation of the concept of organized crime would
aid law enforcement and other governmental agencies at all levels in identi-
fying the problem. The result of overinclusion in criminal law is the pos-
sibility of abusive assaults on individual liberties. The severest critics of
the Act reject solutions to organized crime that carry with them seeds of
official repression by sacrificing basic rights.'7
In defense of the broad application of the Act, the designation of or-
ganized crime is but a "shorthand method of referring to a large and vary-
ing group of criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances."18 The
difficulties in drafting acceptable legislation exclusively applicable to or-
ganized crime are, of course, overwhelming. The standard of segregation
would have to meet the equal protection criteria while the process of appli-
cation would have to be within due process of law. In many situations, es-
pecially in the investigatory provisions of the Act, organized crime's in-
volvement in certain activity is more in the way of a conclusion than criteria
to initiate an investigation. 9 Moreover, the focus of the sponsors of the
Act was directed in each Title to balance the seemingly competing demands
of crime control and individual rights, allowing when needed some form
of procedural safeguards to protect individual liberties by keeping the
provisions within constitutional mandates. 0 Senator McClellan and the
other sponsors of the Act perceived the demand for immediate action
to curtail the power of organized crime. They acted to fashion a compre-
hensive solution to the entire problem by attempting to create a well-
integrated legislative program.
In connection with the other titles in the Act, the legislation provided
that two national investigatory commissions be established: (1) to study
individual rights and (2) to review national policy toward gambling.
Title XII created the National Commission on Individual Rights to in-
dude representatives from the Congress and from all segments of life in
the United States. During its six year tenure the Commission is to explore
federal laws and practices to determine which are effective and which in-
fringe upon the individual rights of citizens. Special study and review is
ordered for the areas of special grand juries (Title I), dangerous special
offender sentencing (Title X), and other recent legislative reform in the
criminal law area such as wiretapping, bail, preventive detention, no-knock
search warrants, and the accumulated files of certain individuals by govern-
mental agencies. Such a commission is needed to study the alleged ero-
17 Supra note 15.
Is McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 8, at 61.
'1ld. at 62.
20 "We must seek ... and achieve a practical reconciliation of the need to preserve our sub-
stantial rights ...... Id. at 200.
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sion of constitutionally guaranteed rights by recent legislation designed to
aid law enforcement in pursuing the criminal element of society. It is
hoped that the Commission's function will include strong recommenda-
tions concerning the disposition of various laws that prove over time to be
ineffective or that cut too deeply into the individual liberties of each citi-
zen. If extended to other innovative measures that tread dangerously close
to the suppression of individual rights, this concept of reviewing the opera-
tion of legislation could become the most significant development of the
Act.
A Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling
is created in Part D of Title VIII. The Commission of fifteen members,
eight appointed by the President, will come into existence two years after
the effective date of the Act. The Commission will review (1) the ef-
fectiveness of existing policy and practices and (2) the existing statutes
that prohibit gambling activities. A final report to the President and to
the Congress is due within the four year period following the effective date
of the establishment of the Commission. Further, the Commission may
hold hearings and is given broad investigatory and subpoena powers. Also,
"The Commission is regarded as 'an agency of the United States' under
subsection (1), section 6001, title 18, United States Code, for the purpose
of granting immunity to witnesses."21 Although the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice did not specifically
recommend a commission on gambling, it did recommend "A permanent
joint congressional committee on organized crime. ' 2  The commission on
gambling goes a long way toward meeting this recommendation since
gambling is the greatest source of revenue for organized crime and in the
words of the President is the "lifeline of organized crime."23 A commis-
sion on gambling, therefore, if it pursues its task with vigor, may prove to
be a very useful tool in the fight against organized crime.
TITLE I-SPECIAL GRAND JURY24
Additional federal grand juries are created under the provisions of
this Title in districts containing four million or more inhabitants or in dis-
tricts where the Attorney General has reason to believe that the criminal
activity warrants special attention. Such special grand juries are empowered
to investigate alleged violations of federal criminal laws and return indict-
ments.25 Additionally, the statute allows the special grand jury to issue re-
21 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (Supp. 1971).
22T FE oN ORGANIZED CRIME 22 (1967).
23 115 CONG. REc. § 12355 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1969).
24For purposes of discussion in the text, references will be made to 18 U.S.C. § 3331-3334,
inclusive.
25 Section 3331(a) also sets the duration of the special grand jury at 18 months with provi-
sions for court-ordered extensions for a maximum of 36 months or earlier dissolution if the jury
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ports, regarding either organized crime conditions in the district or the non-
criminal misconduct involving organized crime of appointed public of-
ficers or employees (including state and municipal), providing a basis for
recommending dismissal or disciplinary action. In conjunction with the
reporting power of the special grand jury, provisions are made to review
the scope and basis of the report by the district court and to provide a num-
ber of ways in which a person accused of noncriminal misconduct may
present an answer to the report before it is disclosed to the public. The
reporting powers of the special grand jury, especially in the area of non-
criminal misconduct, represent the focal point of constitutional controversy
in Title I.
Historically, grand juries have been given very broad powers of investi-
gation into criminal activity. Courts have noted that a grand jury is com-
petent to act solely on its own volition to inquire whether a crime has been
committed.26  At common law the grand jury's function was not only to
return indictments concerning criminal activities but also "to keep the King
in touch with the affairs of each community."27  In that way and others the
group of impartial citizens comprising the grand jury acted as a buffer be-
tween the citizenry and the central government. The common law grand
jury in England had the power to issue reports; but as the institution of the
grand jury developed in this country, the reporting power of the grand jury
was severely curtailed by the courts.28
The reporting provisions of Title I farther the goals of exposing or-
ganized crime's influence in a community and of discovering evidence to
be used to destroy organized crime's power.' However, the basis for the
actual procedural aspects of the reporting power and the safeguards to in-
determines by a majority vote that its business is completed. Furthermore, if the district court
fails to extend the term before the special grand jury determines that it has completed its busi-
ness, the jury by a majority vote may ask the chief judge of the circuit to extend the term (§
3331(b) ). Finally, § 3332(b) directs the district court to impanel additional special grand
juries if the court finds that the volume of business exceeds the capacity of one jury.
26Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 60, 65 (1906); accord, Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273, 282 (1919); United States v. Harte-Hanks Newspapers, 254 F.2d 366, 369-70 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 938 (1958) (the broad power to conduct investigations is fettered
only by the requirements of constitutional rights); In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 32 F.R.D.
175 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); appeal dismissed, 318 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
802 (1963).
27 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 8, at 64. For a good summary and his-
tory of the development of the modern day grand jury, see Blakey, supra note 9, at 83.
2 8 See Kuh, Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103,
1105-1110 (1955); Application of United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp.
858, 863 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); I Re Petition for Disclosure, 184 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960).
But see, In Re Presentment of Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952);
In Re Report of Grand Jury, 11 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1943). For a good summary of policy consid-
erations involved in grand jury reporting, see Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body,
74 HARV. L. REV. 590 (1961).
29 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETy 200 (1967). For other purposes of
the special grand jury reports, see Blakey, supra note 9, at 84; McClellan, The Organized Crime
Act, supra note 8, at 77, 82 (the reporting provisions are an effective and fair means of improv-
ing the quality of government).
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dividuals criticized in the reports is derived from a New York statute.30
The complexities of the policy considerations and the constitutional im-
plications that'underlie grand jury reporting power are illustrated by the
New York experience with grand jury reports. In Jones v. People,"1 the
Supreme Court of New York upheld a grand jury's power to report on spe-
cific instances of noncriminal misconduct of identified individuals on the
basis of the grand jury's exercise of its common law inquisitorical powers.
However, a strong dissent argued that the grand jury by submitting the
report had gone beyond the two great purposes of a grand jury (to bring
to trial those properly charged with a crime and to protect citizens against
unfounded accusations of crime) to administer punishment in the way of
public censure without the right to answer and without the opportunity to
have a judicial forum determine the truth or falsity of the attack.2  The
disposition of the case by the New York Court of Appeals33 left the ques-
tion of grand jury reporting power uncertain, but the reasoning of the dis-
sent was generally followed in New York3l4 and used in other jurisdictions
to justify a restrictive view of the reporting powers of grand juries.3 5  In
Wood v. Hughes,30 the New York Court of Appeals struc down the
power of a grand jury to report on misconduct charges involving public
officials when no evidence was uncovered warranting an indictment. Uti-
lizing the basic reasoning of the dissent in Jones,37 the court analogized ac,
cusation by report to accusation by indictment, declaring that in the public
mind accusation by report subjected a public official to the same condem-
nation and opprobrium as if he had been indicted without according him
the benefit of protections accorded someone who is indicted. 3 However,
this statement of the law was changed by the enactment of § 253-a which
became the model for the reporting provisions of Title I.
3 0 N.Y. CODE OF gRIM. PROCEDURE § 253-a (McKinney Supp. 1971). For other states
with grand jury reporting powers similar to New York, see McClellan, The Organized Crime
Act, supra note 8, at 64 n, 42. The drafters of the reporting section also relied heavily upon the
reasoning of In Re Presentment of Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952)
(opinion of Chief Justice Vanderbuilt).
;3 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N.Y.S. 275 (2nd Dept. 1905), appeal dismissed, 181 N.Y. 389,
74 N.E. 226 (1905).
32Id. at 59, 92 N.Y.S. at 277.
3Iln Re Jones, 181 N.Y. 389, 74 N.E. 226 (1905).
3 4 E.g., People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 333-34, 266 N.Y.S. 368 (Sup. Ct 1933).
3 5See Kuh, supra note 28, at 1105; accord, Application of United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers, 111 F. Sup . 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
36 9 N.Y.2d 144, 173 N.E.2d 21,212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
37 A report is ".... a moral condemnation or exhortation without any forum being provided
for explanation or defense." Id. at 148 n.1, 173 N.E.2d at 22 n.1, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 34 n.1.
38 d. at 154, 173 N.E.2d at 26212 N.Y.S.2d at 39-40. For an example of the possible harsh
repercussions of a grand jury report, see A B C N Y REPORT 11 (1970). For an exploration
into the various elements involved in the investigation of an individual resulting in condemna-
tion and opprobrium problems, see Note, The Effect of Public Opprobrium on Investigative Due
Process, 22 S. C. L. REV. 392, 401-06 (1970).
3 9 1n Re GrandJury, 52 Misc. 2d 895, 277 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1967), involved a re-
[Vol. 32.
A constitutional consideration of the reporting power of special grand
juries must begin with an exploration of the outer limits of the fifth amend-
ment due process clause in the area of investigatory bodies. Neither the
New York statute nor 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333 affords a public official accused
of noncriminal misconduct in office the full panoply of procedural safe-
guards to which a defendant in a criminal trial is entitled.4" Although
the concepts of fundamental fairness and ordered liberty have been gen-
erally equated with the constitutional requirements of due process of law,41
the substantive rights encompassed by procedural due process are vacillat-
ing and the application of a particular right in a specific proceeding de-
pends upon a complexity of factors: the nature of the right, the nature of
the proceeding, and the possible effect of that right on the proceeding.4
Usually, fundamental fairness in an adjudicatory qua criminal context re-
quired the basic rights to confront and cross-examine witness,43 to present
evidence,44 and to consult with counsel.45  The same basic rights have been
port under the provisions of § 253-a that was reviewed and rejected as not within the statute.
The case, however, was not decided on any constitutional grounds. There are several impor-
tant distinctions between § 3331 and § 253-a. The New York law in § 253-a(1) provides for
three instances in which grand jury reports are proper: (1) concerning non-criminal misconduct,
nonfeasance, or neglect of a public officer or employee; (2) exonerating a public officer or em-
ployee from charges of non-criminal misconduct;, (3) recommending legislative, executive, or ad-
ministrative action in the public interest as long as the report is not critical of an identified or
identifiable person. Section 3331 (a) limits the bases for reports by providing only two
grounds: (1) regarding non-criminal misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance involving organ-
ized crime by an appointed public officer or employee; (2) concerning organized crime condi-
tions in the district as long as the report is not critical of an identified person (emphasis added).
The changes in § 3331(a)(1) are significant in that they reflect an attempt on the part of the
drafters of Title I to limit the application of the non-criminal misconduct reports to a degree of
willful misconduct (not negligent behavior) with organized crime and to eliminate references
to elected officials in any report. The deletion of the word identifiable in § 3331(a)(2) from the
model was not intended by the drafters of the Act to be a material departure. Rather, the word
identified is to be read broadly to include not only identification by name but also by ordinary
means by which an individual is dearly distinguished. It was thought that the word identifiable
could be read so broadly as to eliminate the effect of the report provision on organized crime.
See McClellan, supra note 8, at 75-76. Finally, § 253-a(2)(b) of the New York statute provides
for examination of the report and the grand jury's minutes by a court before it orders the re-
port accepted and filed as part of the public record to determine whether the grand jury's find-
ings are supported by a preponderance of the credible and legally admissible evidence (emphasis
added). Section 3331(b)(1) also directs court review of the report and minutes before acceptance
and filing, but the standard of proof to be applied is only a preponderance of the evidence.
Since federal grand juries are allowed to consider evidence not admissible at trial, hearsay evi-
dence could be included as the basis of a report. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359
(1959).
40 Letter from Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, to the Hon. Emanuel Cellar, Chair-
man, committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, July 23, 1970, as contained in H.R.
REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
4 1 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
4 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
4 3 E.g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 378 U.S. 96,103-04 (1963); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-99 (1959); cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
4 4 E .g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938), Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1936).
4, Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335 (1963).
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held not to apply to a nonadjudicatory, fact-finding investigation conducted
by a body like a grand jury.46 The situation is complicated, however,
when a supposedly investigatory body takes on characteristics of adjudica-
tion and hence, requirements of procedural due process are made appli-
cable.47
The cases of Hannah v. Larche4" and Jenkins v. McKeithen49 point
out the difficulties in attempting to determine when an investigatory body
is sufficiently adjudicatory in nature to warrant the requirements of pro-
cedural due process in its proceeding. In Hannah the Civil Rights Com-
mission created by the Voting Rights Act of 1957"" was declared by the
Supreme Court of the United States to be investigatory in nature over ob-
jections that the investigation would result in irreparable harm to those
investigated with the likelihood of the loss of their jobs. The Court deter-
mined that since the Commission made no findings of civil or criminals
liability, no orders, no indictments, and no imposition of punishment or
other legal sanctions (in effect, it took no affirmative action on individual's
rights), its conclusions were not "depriving anyone of life, liberty, or
property" requiring the application of procedural due process rights.5' In
Jenkins, the Court held that a state investigatory commission, limited in
scope to inquiries into violations of criminal law, was in reality exercising
a function not unlike an official adjudication of criminal culpability, pub-
licly branding the named individual as criminal.2 Both cases used the
4 6 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 446, 449 (1960). "A witness before a grand jury can-
not insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by his counsel, nor can a
witness before other investigatory bodies." In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957). But see,
People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y. 2d 418, 235 N..2d 439, 288 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1968) (a witness
testifying in front of a grand jury can leave the room at any time to consult with counsel regard-
ing his legal rights); United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
47 Generally, an adjudicatory body makes findings of fact that serve as a basis for the im-
position of official sanction or other action affecting a substantive right. On the other hand,
an investigatory body makes fact-findings that serve either a strict informing and reporting
function or a pre-prosecutorial, accusatory function. 72 YALE L.J. 1227, 1229-30 (1963).
However, the occasional dual role of an "investigatory" body as a fact-finder and reporter and as
an accuser blurs whatever distinction there may have been under the investigatory-adjudicatory
analysis.
48 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
49395 U.S. 411 (1969), reh. denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). Both Hannah and Jenkins
dealt with procedural due process in the context of an administrative proceeding and only men-
tioned grand juries as a reference point.
50 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1975-1975 (e).
51363 U.S. at 420, 411 (1960).
52 395 U.S. at 411, 427-428 (1969). "Were the Commission exercising an accusatory func-
tion, were its duty to find named individuals were responsible . .. and to advertise such find-
ing ... , the rigorous protection relevant to criminal prosecutions might well be the controlling
starting point for assessing the protection which the Commission's procedure provides." Hannah
v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 488 (1960) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). It has
been suggested that the public opprobrium problems inherent in investigations could be solved
by either providing the accused the opportunity to rebut the finding of the investigation or
maintaining strict control over the gathered information from reaching the public. 22 S. CALIF.
L. REV. 392, 406-10 (1970); 72 YALE L.J. 1227, 1239 (1963).
example of the grand jury as a focal point characterizing an investigatory
body. The Court stated that grand juries only investigated and reported
and had no adjudicative function. Such a characterization of grand jury
activity justified the lack of the rights of cross-examination and confronta-
tion usually essential to the fundamental fairness of procedural due pro-
cess because the guarantees of due process require greater safeguards for
an individual in an adjudicatory proceeding than in an investigatory pro-
ceeding.
Special grand jury reports on organized crime conditions in a district
are basically investigatory in nature and do not seem to be offensive to
constitutional standards of procedural due process as long as the reports
are not critical of an identified person.53 However, difficulty arises in
characterizing special grand jury reports when the reports concern non-
criminal misconduct of an appointed public official or employee involved
with organized crime. Although the individual accused of the misconduct
is accorded procedural safeguards such as the right to be notified of the
charges in the report before public disclosure, the right of the accused and
a reasonable number of his witnesses to testify before the grand jury prior
to the filing of the report, the right to answer in writing the charges and
to have that answer included as an appendix to the report, and the right to
appeal a judicial finding that the report is within the statutory limitation,
the hearings that precede the special grand jury's conclusion are ex parte
and the accused has neither the right to confront his accusors or to cross-
examine adverse witnesses. Unlike a grand jury indictment that can lead to
a judicial forum to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, a re-
port on non-criminal misconduct is only a basis for a recommendation of
removal or disciplinary action.a
The use of hearsay evidence by federal grand juries amplifies the prob-
lems of assuring fundamental fairness, which are involved in the lack of
a judicial forum to vindicate charges of complicity with organized crime."
53 Application of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 863 n.
12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (grand juries at common law had the power to issue reports on general con-
ditions but there was uncertainty over censuring individuals); 56 VA. L REv. 487, 496 (1970)
(where there is no determination made concerning specific persons, there is no necessity for
constitutional safeguards). Although the use of hearsay evidence by federal grand juries may
present a problem for other grounds of reporting, it would seem that the fairness of reports
on organized crime conditions in a district would not be affected by the use of hearsay declara-
dons. Contra, Kub, supra note 28, at 1126.
G4 In one sense such a report is punishment in the form of a public reprimand based upon an
ex parte proceeding. Application of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 111 F.
Supp. 858, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In administrative agencies the use of publicity as a device for
punishment is widely used, see Rourke, Law Euforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. Cliu. L
REV. 225 (1957).
55 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); cf United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251
(1966). But see, United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 80 (1967), "... [We think ... that excessive use of hearsay
[by] ... grand juries tends to destroy.., the protection from unwarranted prosecutions that
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If the keystone of a proper special grand jury report includes a concept of
fairness that guarantees the rights of an accused to procedural safeguards,
it would then seem that a report should be premised on legally admissible
evidence and not hearsay, because a hearsay declaration in a report is not
amenable to cross-examination." The probable use of hearsay evidence
in investigations of special grand juries and in reports on non-criminal
misconduct multiply the difficulties of determining whether the provisions
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3333 are adequate under the circumstances to protect
constitutional rights, or whether the doctrine of procedural due process
requires more.
In a situation where an appointed public official or employee is ac-
cused and then found by a preponderance of the evidence before the spe-
cial grand jury that he has perpetrated non-criminal misconduct involving
organized crime, it is uncertain how the due process clause will be applied.
The basic constitutional objection leveled at the special grand jury report-
ing procedure on non-criminal misconduct is that the accused is denied the
right to cross-examine witnesses who testify at the special grand jury hear-
ings. By traditional due process analysis the guarantees that have been
considered required in a specific proceeding have been determined in ref-
erence to that proceeding's similarity to a criminal adjudication. The limi-
tations of due process outside the criminal context have not been specifi-
cally delineated. Furthermore, the procedural due process analysis in
Hannah and Jenkins has been based upon the characterization of the pro-
ceeding in question. In turn, the characterization of the proceeding has
been based upon the stated function or purpose of the proceeding and upon
the nature of the harm resulting from the proceeding's operation.
Such an accusation and finding by the special grand jury that an ap-
pointed official or employee has been involved in non-criminal misconduct
involving organized crime are explicitly to be used as a basis for removal
from office. A man's employment has been field to be included in the
term property within the fifth amendment due process clause. 57  Govern-
mental action that would deprive an individual of such property seri-
ously injures that person and would seem to require the opportunity for
cross-examination and confrontation to prove the accusations and findings
as untrueP8 Furthermore, from the investigatory-adjudicatory distinction
grand juries are supposed to afford the innocent. Hearsay evidence should only be used when
direct testimony is unavailable...."
5 8 Kuh, supra note 28, at 1126, n.96.
5 7 Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); 56 V.. L. R.Ev. 487, 496 n.68 (1970) (the
right to employment has long been held within liberty and property concepts of due process).
58 56 VA. L REV. 487, 496 (1970). There is also the consideration that by the time the
accused has a right to appear and produce witnesses the jury has already made up its collective
mind and the burden of persuading them to change is on the accused. H.R. REP. No. 1549,
91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
[Vol. 32
NOTES
as formulated in Hannah v. Larche,59 it appears that a special grand jury
report which may result in a public employee's dismissal because of some
form of non-criminal misconduct connected to organized crime, is an af-
firmative act that can adversely affect an individual's rights. 0 But the lan-
guage in Jenkins v. McKeithen6" seems to imply that every accusatory body,
especially a grand jury, is not required to provide all or some of the con-
stitutionally guaranteed rights under the due process clause unless that
body performs a function similar to a finding of criminal culpability. A
special grand jury's report on non-criminal misconduct is distinguishable
from the finding in Jenkins on the basis that it does not determine criminal
guilt. Analytically, therefore, the reporting provisions of § 3333 fit neither
the mold of Jenkins nor Hannah regarding the applicability of procedural
due process rights. If the due process analysis were reduced to the criteria
contained in Hannah, a decision may turn on the idea that the rights of
cross-examination and confrontation may be too much of a burden on the
investigatory proceedings of a special grand jury inquiry into organized
crime, when there exist statutory procedural safeguards and judicial review
of the report before its public disclosure. Such procedural safeguards may
satisfy a less stringent standard of procedural due process than is required
for the adjudication of criminal guilt. In any event, the right of an in-
dividual to the guarantees of procedural due process raises a substantial
constitutional issue with regard to special grand jury reports that can only
be resolved by judicial interpretation.
There are two other constitutional problems raised by the power of
special grand juries to report on non-criminal misconduct of appointed
public officers or employees. In all cases under § 3333 (a) (1) a special
grand jury must find that the public employee under investigation has com-
mitted non-criminal misconduct involving organized crime before a report
on the activities of the employee can be made. In drafting the statute,
special care was taken to assure that any inadvertent contact with organ-
ized crime would not cause a report to issue. 2 However, the statute pro-
vides no standards by which the crucial element of misconduct may be ap-
plied.6 3 Such a contingency makes the statute amenable to constitutional
objections on the ground that the term "misconduct" is vague and that a
public employee really does not know and must guess at structuring his
conduct so that he will not be susceptible to a derogatory report that may
result in his dismissal.6 4 In addition, the uncertainty is magnified by the
lack of a reference to the term non-criminal in § 3333 (a) (1). Although
9 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
60 Id. at 441.
61395 U.S. 411, reh. denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
62 H.L. R]3P. No. 1549,91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
03A B C N Y REPoRT 10-11 (1970).
04See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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a broad reading of non-criminal would include state and federal criminal
offenses, the word could be interpreted in a restrictive sense to include
crimes defined only by federal law. Even though such a construction
is not very probable, the possibility of several different interpretations to
the phrase "non-criminal misconduct" reveals that the constitutional man-
date for definiteness in statutory language may be breached by §
3333 (a) (1).(1
Under article III of the Constitution, the nation's judicial power is al-
lotted to the federal courts. It has been determined that such a grant of
power does not include the prerogative of a court to invade areas that are
reserved for the other branches of government. 0 Although a federal grand
jury has great independence in many areas, it has still been considered an
appendage of the court, having jurisdiction co-extensive with that of the
court. 7  Special grand juries that have the power to issue reports on the
conduct of appointed officials in other branches of government would
appear to go beyond the judiciary's grant of power in article III and
violate the separation of powers doctrine that courts have carefully
guarded."" As a matter of logic, though, the reporting function given
special grand juries in § 3333 (a) (1) is no more a violation of the
concept of separation of powers than indicting a public official for criminal
conduct in the performance of his duties; and the function of criticism by
a special grand jury is analogous to a court noting statutory defects and
suggesting amendments. 69
Except for the constitutional difficulties inherent in Title I's reporting
provisions, the creation of federal special grand juries can contribute to
the national attack on organized crime by alerting the community to the
activities of the professional criminal. The toleration for organized crime
in America has resulted in part from an ignorance of its various operations
in a specific community. The creation of special grand juries and their re-
porting power is directed to remedying that ignorance.
65 A construction that would cause special grand juries to make findings and issue reports
on state defined criminal conduct would bring the statute closer to the subject litigated in Jenkins
v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, reh. denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
60 See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947).
67 Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959); Application of United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
8United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-91 (1947); Application of United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 864-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); cf. Ala-
bama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934).
6O Senate Hearings 369. The Department of Justice comments also observed that in the
case of the reporting function in § 3331(a)(1) the powers of a federal grand jury would be so
changed that it would become an independent body to which the separation of powers argument
would not apply. This characterization of the special grand jury's role in reporting non-criminal
misconduct strengthens the arguments favoring the imposition of procedural due process re-




Title II establishes an immunity provision designed to replace more
than fifty federal immunity statutes now in operation. The provision
may be invoked in the case of any witness who
...refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two
Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the
person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an or-
der issued under this part.. 70
The immunity provided is as follows:
... no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other in-
formation) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order.71
The immunity provided by this provision is commonly referred to as
"use immunity" or alternatively "testimonial immunity." Use immunity
may be defined as a grant of immunity which prevents the use of the wit-
ness' testimony and its fruits from being used against the witness in any
manner in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. This def-
inition of immunity arises out of the Supreme Court decision in Murphy v.
Waterront Commission.72  The proponents of Title II argue that Murphy
sub silentio overrules an older Supreme Court decision, Counselman v.
Hitchcock,73 which laid down the rule as to "transactional immunity."
Transactional immunity may be defined as "... . absolute immunity against
future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." 74  Of
course, the critics of Title II argue that Counselman has not been sub
silentio overruled and that mere use immunity is constitutionally deficient
since use immunity is not co-extensive with the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to resolve this conflict
over immunity in Piccirillo v. New York. 75 However, the writ of certiorari
was dismissed as improvidently granted. In a dissenting opinion concurred
70 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 1971).
71Id.
72 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
73 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
74ld. at 586.
75 400 U.S. 548 (1971).
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in by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan held that the federal government
in a federal case must grant absolute transactional immunity."
Two recent decisions in the federal courts dealing with Title II have
reached opposite conclusions in resolving this issue. In Stewart v. United
States,77 the Ninth Circuit determined that Title II was constitutionally
sound. In reaching the conclusion that use immunity was sufficient, the
Court gave controlling weight to the following footnote in Murphy:
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant
of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal
authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted
by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the dis-
puted evidence. 78
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the language of this footnote indi-
cated ". . . that the [Supreme] Court does not believe that the immunized
testimony must bar all prosecution for the 'transaction' about which he
testified."79
It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit did not mention Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion in Piccirillo or the federal district court decision,
In Re Kinoy, ° reaching a contrary result to that of Stewart v. United
States. In Kinoy the court determined that Counselman v. Hitchcock had
not been sub silentio overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.
Further, the court indicated that Counselman had been reaffirmed by a
Supreme Court case subsequent to Murphy. A year after the Murphy deci-
sion, the Supreme Court decided Albertson v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board.8' In Albertson, the Supreme Court measured the immunity
provision before them against the standards mentioned in Counselman.
One of the standards quoted was ". .. absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question relates."' 2  It would in-
deed appear then that the Supreme Court had reaffirmed the Counselman
requirement for transactional immunity.
However, the Court in Kinoy failed to note that the Supreme Court
subsequently reaffirmed the position taken in Murphy when it decided
Gardner v. Broderick.s3
Answers may be compelled regardless of the privilege [against self-
incriminationj if there is immunity from federal and state use of the
76 Id. at 522 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971).
78378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
79440 F.2d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1971).
80 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
81382 U.S. 70 (1965).
s2 Id. at 80.
83 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968).
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compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecu-
tion against the person testifying.84
The citation to the Counselman case in support of the use immunity
standard is puzzling but not all that surprising when one remembers that
the Counselman case gave lip service to both immunity standards.
In Stevens v. Marks,85 decided only two years before Gardner v. Brod-
erick, the Court said:
We need not stop to determine whether the immunity said to be conferred
here-which merely prevents the use of the defendant's testimony or its
fruits in any subsquent prosecution but, apparently, does not preclude
prosecution based on "independent" evidence... -constitutes that "abso-
lute immunity against further prosecution" about which the Court spoke in
Counselman v. Hitchcock . . . and which the Court said was necessary if
the privilege were to be constitutionally supplanted.8 6
In light of this language, it is difficult to conclude that the Court in
Gardner meant to disavow the absolute immunity standard of Counsel-
man when the Court did not specifically state such.
If anything is dear from the above analysis, it is that the decisions of
the Supreme Court are not dear on this issue. There is language in these
decisions supporting the notion that use immunity is constitutionally ac-
ceptable, but these same decisions have not disavowed the requirement of
"absolute immunity" contained in Counselman.
Even assuming that use immunity is constitutionally adequate, it poses
a serious problem in operation. Once a witness has testified under immu-
nity he can only be prosecuted for the acts concerning which he has testi-
fied if the prosecution can establish ".... an independent, legitimate source
for the disputed evidence."8s  A defendant would be faced with a very
difficult task to rebut the government's proof of "independent source."
Further, such a requirement would result in an increased amount of litiga-
tion since a motion to suppress the evidence would be the inevitable result
of the government's presentation of such evidence. Certainly, there are
considerations to be taken into account when the courts pass upon the con-
stitutionality of Title II's use immunity.
TITLE VI-DEPOSITIONS
8
The enactment of Title VI is basically designed to preserve the testi-
mony of witnesses by use of depositions in situations where organized
crime has been known to use strong-arm methods to silence witnesses will-
84 Id. at 276.
85383 U.S. 234 (1966).
so ld. at 244.
8 7M urphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
8s 18 U.S.C.A. § 3503 (Supp. 1971).
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ing to testify adversely to members of the crime syndicate.8 Like Title V
(Protested Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses), the ability to
depose witnesses by the government will tend to eliminate the incentive
to harass violently such witnesses.
Under federal law before Title VI, depositions in a criminal proceed-
ing could only be taken by order of the court on a motion initiated by
the defendantf 0 The Congress in § 3503 gave to the government (The
Department of Justice) the power to depose witnesses in proceedings
where there is reason to believe the defendant has participated in organ-
ized criminal activity. The Government, though, must prove that an ex-
ceptional situation exists which makes the deposition in the interest of jus-
ticeY1 In the process of taking a deposition, the provisions of § 3503
give to the defendant the right to be notified and present at the recording of
the deposition, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to cross-
examine the witness being deposed to the extent that would be allowed at
trial, and the right to use any statement made by the witness prior to the
deposition and in the possession of the government. Additionally, the
defendant cannot be deposed against his will and hence, his fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination is protected.
Until the decision in California v. Green, 2 there was a great deal of
8 9 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 8, at 100; A B C N Y REPORT 24
(1970).
9O FED. R. CalM. P. 15. Such depositions are taken as a matter of judicial discretion, unlike
depositions as a matter or right under FED. R. CIVIL P. 26(a) and 30. Cf. Wilson v. Bowie,
408 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1969).
91 Similarly, when the defendant wishes to depose one of his witnesses, he must prove that
the deposition will prevent a failure of justice. FED. IL CraM. P. 15(a). The standard for the
government to depose a witness seems to be more restrictive because it must prove that the situa-
tion is of such exceptional nature as to warrant the deposition in the interest of justice. Other
major similarities between § 3503 and Rule 15 include instances when a deposition may be ad-
mitted in whole or in part at trial. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (e) with 18 U.S.C.A. §
3503(f) (Supp. 1971).
92 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), was decided subsequent
to the Green decision and has considerably confused the dimensions of constitutional confronta-
tion. In Evans a co-conspirator of the defendant Evans made a casual remark to a prison inmate-
employee implicating Evans as a participant in the murder conspiracy. Under a Georgia statu-
tory exception to the hearsay rule, the inmate-employee was called to testify concerning the re-
mark in the murder trial of Evans. Evans argued before the Supreme Court of the United States
that the testimony in issue denied him the right to be confronted guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment. The Court in a 5-4 decision without an opinion of the Court (actually the split was 4-1-4,
Mr. Justice Harlan concurring in result with the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice
White, and Mr. Justice Blackmun, who also concurred separately with the Chief Justice) held
that the testimony by the prison inmate about the co-conspirator's remark was admissible so far
as constitutional confrontation was concerned. In a confusing opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart,
who wrote for the bulk of the majority, the plurality of the Court determined that the testimony
in question was only "peripheral"; and as limited to the implications of the co-conspirator's re-
mark with regard to Evans' identity in the murder plot, the confrontation right was not denied
because (1) the jury was warned by the "face" of the statement against giving it undue weight,
(2) the co-conspirator's personal knowledge of the identity of the participants in the conspiracy
was already "abundantly established"; (3) the possibility of faulty recollection is extreme; (4) the
remark was spontaneous and against the conspirator's penal interest. Id. at 87-89. In a
separate concurrence, Mr. Justice Blackmun declared his belief that the inclusion of the ques-
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uncertainty whether the sixth amendment confrontation dause guaran-
teed a criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses testifying
against him, as a trial right identical to the common law hearsay rule
with its exceptions. The constitutional right to confrontation has been
defined as the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to pre-
clude depositions or ex parte affidavits from being used against the de-
fendant. 4 Extra-judicial statements of witnesses have been held to be
inadmissible at trial where the witness was unavailable for cross-examina-
tion at trial and there has been no effective cross-examination at the time
that the testimony was elicited.9r The Court, however, intimated before
Green that such extra-judicial statements may have been admissible if sub-
ject to cross-examination at the time that they were given." But with the
decisions of Barber v. Page7 and Berger v. California,s it appeared that
the Supreme Court of the United States was implying that the only effec-
tive cross-examination meeting constitutional standards was before the
ultimate trier of fact. In Green, the Court clarified the constitutional con-
frontation right, taking the position that a witness' testimony is constitu-
tionally valid when either the witness has not been cross-examined at the
time of the testimony but is available for cross-examination on this previous
testimony at trial or the witness has been subject to full and effective cross-
examination at the time the testimony was extracted and is unavailable to
testify at trial. The power of the government to depose prospective wit-
nesses under the limitations of § 3503 is dearly upheld by the latter ground
for decision in Green. Furthermore, the requirement that the govern-
ment disclose all of the statements made by the witness and held by the
government protects the defendant's rights to an effective cross-examination
at the deposition proceeding within the requirements of procedural due
process of law.09
Permissible instances in § 3503(f) when extra-judicial statements may
tioned testimony was harmless error if it was error at all. Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the
dissent, reasoned that the statement of a co-conspirator was so prejudicial that it could only be
admitted if there was an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. at 110.
Since the full impact of the Evans decision upon constitutional confrontation is uncertain
at this time, the basic rationale of the decision in Califoria v. Green, supra, remains a viable
precedent for the proposition that full and adequate cross-examination at the time that an extra-
judicial statement is made satisfies the requirements of the sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion.
93 Compare, 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397 at 127 with 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
94 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 418 (1964).
95 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1964) (the
unavailability of the wimess stemmed from his refusal to answer any questions, declaring his
right against self-incrimination).
90 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1964).
97390 U.S. 719 (1968).
9 393 U.S. 314 (1969).
90 Senate Hearings 373.
1971] NOTES
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
be used at trial seem to be a codification of the present case law on the
unavailability of a witness to be cross-examined.100 Since constitutional
objections to government depositions seem to be adequately met by Cali-
fornia v. Green,101 governmental depositions seem to be an easy and effec-
tive way of bolstering the evidence-gathering forces against organized
crime.
TITLE VII-LrrIGATION CONCERNING
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE' °2
In Weeks v. United States'"° the exclusionary rule was first formu-
lated by the Supreme Court of the United States to deal with evidence
that was obtained by a violation of the fourth amendment right to be se-
cure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court reasoned that
the judiciary should not sanction unlawful searches and seizures by allow-
ing law enforcement agencies to secure convictions by utilizing evidence
so acquired. 0 4 Furthermore, the use of unconstitutionally procured evi-
dence effectively denied an individual of his fourth amendment rights.103
The Court refined the implications and applications of the exclusionary rule
in federal courts in the subsequent cases of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
10 0 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), indicates that a witness must be actually unavail-
able to testify at trial. This means that the government must have made a good faith effort to
obtain the appearance of the witness at trial. The burden of proving the actual unavailability
of witnesses has generally been placed upon the prosecution, Wilson v. Bowie, 408 F.2d 1105
(9th Cir. 1969).
101399 U.S. 149 (1970).
102 18 U.S.C.A. § 3504 (Supp. 1971). The section reads as follows:
Litigation concerning sources of evidence.
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States-
(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because it is
the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation
of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the
alleged unlawful act,
(2) disclosure of information for a determination if evidence is inadmissible be-
cause it is the primary product of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968,
or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act occurring prior to
June 19, 1968, shall not be required unless such information may be relevant to a
pending claim of such inadmissibility; and
(3) no claim shall be considered that evidence of an event is inadmissible on
the ground that such evidence was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act
occurring prior to June 19, 1968, if such event occurred more than five years after such
allegedly unlawful act.
(b) As used in this section "unlawful act" means any act the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device (as defined in section 2510(5) of this title) in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States or any regulation or standard promul-
gated pursuant thereto.
103 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
104 Id. at 392.
1o5 Id. at 398. Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
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United States'00 and Nardone v. United States.0 7 In Silverthorne the
Court recognized that evidence obtained by exploiting information pro-
cured in a constitutionally unlawful manner was inadmissible in federal
courts like the direct product of the illegal act. However, it was alterna-
tively realized that the substance of impermissibly obtained evidence could
become admissible if it was proved from an independent source. 08 An-
other limitation was placed upon the application of the exclusionary rule in
Nardone where it was recognized that although a technical argument
could make out a causal connection between the evidence obtained by the
unlawful act and the government's proof such connection could have be-
come so attenuated as to dissipate the taint and allow the government's
proof to be used at trial. 09
Other cases involving the exclusionary rule have held that private con-
versations, if illegally overheard, and their "fruits" are subject to motions
to suppress" ° and that suppression of the product of an unconstitutional
search can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated
by the search and not by those aggrieved solely by the introduction of
damaging evidence." Therefore, in the context of wiretapping, electronic
eavesdropping, and other forms of unauthorized electronic surveillance,
a fourth amendment violation is constituted when (1) the evidence to
be used for conviction has been acquired directly from the illegal activity
or a product of the exploitation of the information acquired by the illegal
activity, and (2) the overheard conversations involved the party asserting
his constitutional rights or occurred on the premises of the asserting party
whether or not that party participated in the conversations." 2
As the scope of the application of the exclusionary rule expanded into
the areas of illegally overheard conversations, the federal judiciary became
faced with the problem of devising procedures to facilitate the processing
of an increased number of motions to suppress evidence ,unconstitutionally
100251 U.S. 385 (1920).
107 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
108251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
109 308 U.S. at 341. The Court went onto observe:
... [The trial judge must give opportunity ... to the accused to prove that a sub-
stantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves
ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had
an independent origin.
For an example of the Court applying the attenuation doctrine in the form of a test-the
evidence is either a product of the exploitation of the illegality or sufficiently distinct to be
purged of the punery taint. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
110 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (the reach of the fourth amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961) (conversations overheard because of unauthorized electronic surveillance carried
out by physical intrusion are fruits of an illegal entry).
" Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 492 (1963).
1l12 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969).
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tainted by fourth amendment violations. After meeting the two threshold
issues of (1) whether or not the surveillance was illegal in a constitutional
sense and (2) whether or not the movent has standing to assert a fourth
amendment exdusionary rule claim, the movent has the burden to go for-
ward with specific evidence of the tainted character of the government's
proof.113 To fulfill this burden of showing a causal relation between the
government's unconstitutional act and its evidence, the movent must be in-
formed of the contents of the government's surveillance records so that he
may intelligently argue the unconstitutional taint of certain proof put by
the government. However, the records of a particular surveillance may be
voluminous and contain material that is irrelevant to the set of circum-
stances under litigation. Disclosure of the irrelevant records could be
highly detrimental in several respects," 4 and the reluctance to reveal the
substance of an entire surveillance record was in many ways well-founded.
In Alderman v. United States"5 the Supreme Court laid down the rule
that all surveillance records as to which a movent has standing to object
would be turned over to the movent without first being screened by the
trial court to determine the arguable relevancy of certain portions of the
record. The antecedent case of Kalod v. United States"" had recognized
that an ex parte determination of arguable relevancy was unacceptable in
lieu of such a determination in an adversary proceeding. In Alderman
the Court saw only full disclosure of all records as giving the movent his
proper opportunity to produce evidence that the proof of his opponent was
tainted by unconstitutional acts. The government in Alderman had ar-
gued that the surveillance records should be subjected to an in camera in-
spection by the trial judge who would determine the arguable relevancy of
the records. The government reasoned that this procedure was necessary
because the disclosure of an entire record had inherent dangers to the
reputation or safety of individuals other than the parties to the litigation
and conceivably unknown harm to the national security unless the govern-
ment preferred dismissal of the action to protect the contents of the sur-
veillance records. The Court, however, reasoned that the trial judge usu-
ally lacked either the time or the familiarity with the case to undertake the
screening process in cases where the records may be massive and the mar-
gin of error too great." 7  Furthermore, the Court noted the utility of ad-
versary proceedings in a large and complicated hearing that could avoid
exhorbitant expenditure of judicial time and energy while not unduly pre-
113 Id. at 183; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The government,
however, has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is not tainted. 394
U.S. 165, 183 (1969).
1 14 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 8, at 109.
115 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
116 390 U.S. 136 (1968).
.17 "[T]he trial judge ... will be unable to provide the scrutiny which the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule demands." 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969).
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judicing others or the public interest. Finally, realizing that full disclo-
sure at times could be prejudicial to non-litigants, the Court suggested
that the trial judge could issue protective orders where appropriate to pro-
tect against public disclosure of confidential information. 118 The enact-
ment of Title VII was in part a congressional reaction to the Alderman
full disclosure rule.
Section 3504 (a) of 18 U.S.C.A."O creates a three-step process to
regulate the procedure in motions to suppress in federal proceedings. At
the outset the opponent of a claim that evidence is unconstitutionally
tainted must affirm or deny the allegation that an unconstitutional or il-
legal surveillance took place.2 If the claimed fourth amendment viola-
tion concerns allegations that the government's evidence was procured
through exploitation of the unconstitutional or illegal act, the claim may
not be considered if the act in question occurred more than five years be-
fore the event for which the movent is being prosecuted.: 2' Such a five
year time span represents a legislative finding that the relationship between
the impermissible act of surveillance and the alleged unlawful act of the
movant has become so attenuated by the lapse of time as to dissipate the
taint of the impermissible conduct. 2 Whether the allegation in the claim
of inadmissible evidence is based upon the theory that the evidence is the
primary product of the impermissible act or the evidence is the product
of the exploitation of the impermissible act, disclosure of information to
the movent to aid him in determining if the evidence is inadmissible is
not necessary unless it is relevant to the pending claim. 2 3 Such a legisla-
tive directive assumes that the trial court will have to make an in camera
inspection of the surveillance records to determine what portion thereof
is arguably relevant to the situation.
The justifications for the provisions on attenuation and disclosure basi-
cally follow the rationale of the government's argument for in camera
screening in the Alderman case. In formulating the statute the drafters
also took into account the use by criminals of motions to suppress as dila-
tory proceedings causing expense in terms of loss of manpower and inex-
pediency in the administration of justice.'1  In addition, the supporters of
118 Id. at 185.
"19 18 U.S.C.A. § 3504(a) (Supp. 1971). Further references in the text to the provisions
of Tide VII will be made to the appropriate subsection of § 3504.
120 18 U.S.C.A. § 3504 (a) (1) (Supp. 1971).
121 18 U.S.CA. § 3504(a) (3) (Supp. 1971).
122 See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); letter from Will Wilson, Assistant
Attorney General, to the ion. Emanuel Cellar, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, July 23, 1970 as contained in H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1970).
123 18 U.S.CA. § 3504(a) (2) (Supp. 1971).
1241 Letter from Will Wilson, supra note 122; McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra
note 8, at 110, 132.
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Title VII argued that protective orders were not adequate, and the trouble
envisaged by the Alderman case of the unfamiliar judge attempting to
screen a voluminous surveillance record would be solved by the use of fed-
eral magistrates carrying out the in camera screening.'25 On the other
hand, the opponents of these amendments to the present exclusionary rule
procedure contended that the provisions constituted a dilution of the fourth
amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures by
undermining the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and encouraging
illegal activities by law enforcement agencies.12
The difficulties underlying a constitutional analysis of subsection (a) (2)
of Title VII of the statute begin with conflicting theories on the status of the
exclusionary rule in relationship to the fourth amendment. It has been
suggested in limiting the disclosure implementation of the exclusionary
rule that the rule itself is only a means to an end of deterring fourth amend-
ment violations, that it is not an absolute right to suppression, and that
any application of the rule must be evaluated by a balancing process.127
Such an analysis of the exclusionary rule gains support from Linkletter v.
Walker' and Desist v. United States. 9  In both of these retroactivity
cases, the analysis stressed heavily the deterrence purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule, reasoning that deterrence would not be served properly by retro-
active application of the rule in these situations. Further support for the
proposition that the exclusionary rule is not a strict constitutional mandate
is elicited from Walder v. United States, 30 a pre-Mapp opinion that held
that the use of illegally 'seized evidence to impeach a defendant's credibility
to be permissible. However, the Court explicitly stated that the govern-
ment could not make affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully obtained.'
Other more recent decisions seem to indicate support for the theory that
the exclusionary rule is an integral part of the constitutional rights guar-
anteed by the fourth amendment and a conviction based on unconstitutional
evidence is impermissible.3 2 Even the Alderman opinion carries with it
language of both the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule and the
125 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 8, at 125-28; letter from Will Wilson,
supra note 122.
126 A B C N Y RoRT 27-29 (1970).
127 McClellan, The Organized Crime Act, supra note 8, at 112.
128 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The case held that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was not
to be applied retroactively.
129 394 U.S. 244 (1969). The case held that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1969),
was not to be applied retroactively.
180 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
131 Id. at 65.
1
32 "[T]he plain and unequivocal language of [the exclusionary rule) ... to the effect that
[the exclusionary rule] ... is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed." Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961). See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (states can
develop workable rules governing searches and seizures provided the rules do not violate the
constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant com-
mand that evidence illegally seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain).
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concept that evidence unconstitutionally seized cannot be used to convict
a party who has standing to object to the impermissible seizure."'s
The inquiry into whether or not the exclusionary rule is an inseparable
portion of the constitutional rights, though, is not the basic problem in
determining the constitutionality of subsection (a) (2). Rather, the pri-
mary concern of the drafters and the opponents of the provision is whether
the Alderman decision dictated a constitutional mandate or a supervisory
policy over the federal judiciary. The language of the Alderman opinion
is equivocal with regard to the question because nowhere does the Court
explicitly state that the formulated rule is constitutionally based. The pro-
ponents of the subsection use the equivocal nature of the language to raise
the theory that if an opinion can be read as based on constitutional grounds
and as based upon non-constitutional (supervisory) grounds then the fa-
vored interpretation is that the Court did not reach the constitutional ques-
tion. 3  Bolstering the assertion of a supervisory opinion is the language
in the case referring to the practical aspects of the decision.' " In addition,
the experience of Jencks v. United States 38 and the subsequent Jencks
Act 37 shows that previously the Court had decided that a practice involv-
ing the trial judge's determination of relevancy had been declared imper-
missible, only to have the rule changed by the Congress because it was
based upon the Court's supervisory power. However, the language in the
Jencks case was not as equivocal as that of the Alderman case. Further-
more, the criteria used in Jencks dealt with the requirements of "justice"
and not with the implementation of a well-defined constitutional right.
The Alderman opinion in language and surrounding circumstances
seems to present a stronger argument than Jencks that the basis of the de-
cision was constitutionally mandated. If the purpose of the Court in
Alderman was to avoid implementing the constitutional right, 38 the lan-
guage in the opinion strongly indicates that the full disclosure rule has
firm foundations in the constitutional right to have the opportunity to
prove that the government's proof is unconstitutionally tainted. 3 ' In ad-
1 33 Compare 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) with 394 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1969).
134 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 338 (1955); see McClellan, The Original Crime Act,
rupra note 8, at 122-25.
135 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969) (full disclosure would avoid exorbitant expenditure of ju-
dicial time and energy).
136353 U.S. 657 (1957).
'37 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958). The statute was constitutionally upheld in Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959) (the previous rule was an exercise of the Court's power to prescribe
procedure for the administration of justice in federal courts).
13 8 The central issue should not be whether the rule is supervisory or not, but rather does
the rule avoid diminishing the implementation of the constititional mandate. Hill, The Bill of
Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 181, 191 (1969).
189 "Adversary proceedings.. .[guard] against the possibility that the trial judge.. .will be
unable to provide the scrutiny which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule demands."
394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969). See House Hearings 377-79. However, the quoted passage gives
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dition to the supporting language in the opinion, the Court has determined
that in camera inspection of surveillance records by the trial judge would
be a sufficient safeguard of fourth amendment rights in the area of legality
of the surveillance and standing to assert the constitutional claim.140
Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn from the holdings in those cases
regarding legality and standing that whereas in camera inspection is ade-
quate to safeguard an individual's fourth amendment rights on those is-
sues, the question of relevancy of surveillance records which is crucial to
the application of the exclusionary rule cannot be satisfactorily protected
by in camera inspection.
The statutory provisions in subsection (a) (2) that change the full dis-
closure rule of the Alderman case seem at least to be arguably contra-
vening the alleged constitutional significance of that opinion. The statute,
however, is vague enough on its face that the courts interpreting the pro-
visions will be given some discretion in formulating procedures to dis-
cover the relevance of surveillance records in a way that may provide
adequate safeguards to the implementation of fourth amendment rights.
In Nardone v. United States' it was recognized that the causal con-
nection between the unconstitutional act and the alleged crime could have
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the impermissibility. Sub-
section (a) (3) represents a legislative determination that the doctrine of
attenuation is automatically applicable after a five year lapse of time, con-
clusively precluding a movent from asserting that the evidence tending to
prove his involvement is the product of the exploitation of that of a pre-
vious unconstitutional act. The justification for such a determination was
extrapolated from the experience of the federal law enforcement agencies
in dealing with suppression motions. 42 But constitutionally it seems that
the provision suffers from a fatal overbreadth. In Wong Sun v. United
States' the attenuation doctrine was applied to the situation where the
defendant voluntarily made incriminating statements to the police in the
matter of a few hours after he had been illegally arrested and released on
his own recognizance. The Court rejected the "but for" test to identify the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" and formulated the concept that evidence was
"fruit" if it was produced from the exploitation of the primary illegality
-connoting that affirmative action must be taken to uncover the evidence
before it is considered a product of the exploitation. Subsection (a) (3),
however, does not consider the affirmative aspect of the exploitation test
the hint of a suggestion that there may be methods other than full disclosure that could meet
the standards of scrutiny demanded by the fourteenth amendment.
140See House Hearings 378-79 (testimony of Professor Herman Schwartz, member of the
faculty of the State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law), Giordano v. United
States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 315 (1969).
141308 U.S. 338 (1939).
142 See letter from Will Wilson, supra note 122.
143 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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and merely formulates an automatic termination of any right to assert a
violation of fourth amendment rights after five years. It may very well be
true that most of the taint is dissipated after the five year period; but it is
conceivable, especially in the area of long-term plans of organized crime,
that the government's evidence in a given prosecution may be tainted by an
illegal act of surveillance more than five years old. Such a contingency
could cause the loss of a highly valued constitutional right that courts have
worked so vigorously to protect against erosion and destruction. It is cer-
tainly true that attenuation could occur in a very short period as the cir-
cumstances in Wong Sun indicate. However, the blanket provision of
subsection (a) (3) will probably be questioned as an unconstitutional lim-
itation upon the assertion of a constitutional right.
It is uncertain to what extent subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) will
be tested in the courts. The applicability of the various provisions are
limited by the terms contained therein. First, the provisions of subsection
(b) state that subsection (a) is only applicable to litigation involving wire-
tapping and other forms of electronic surveillance.144 Secondly, subsec-
tions (a) (2) and (a) (3) do not apply to a surveillance that occurred after
June 19, 1968, the effective date of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.14r Hence, Title VII's alleged inroads into the
area of the constitutionally commanded right to be secure from unreason-
able searches and seizures may be sporadically tested before the courts if
at all.
TITLE X
This title permits the United States attorney, in the prosecution of an
accused for a federal felony, to file a notice with the court specifying that
the defendant is a "dangerous special offender" as that term is defined in the
act.146 In such cases, if the defendant is convicted of the felony of which
144The illegal types of surveillance are defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(5) (1968).
145 82 Star. 211 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A.) (statute makes unauthorized
electronic surveillance a serious crime).
140 18 U.S.C.AL § 3575 (e). A defendant is a special offender for purposes of this section
if-(1) the defendant has previously been convicted in courts of the United States, a
State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or pos-
session of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof for two or more offenses committed on occasions different from
one another and from such felony and punishable in such courts by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year, for one or more of such convictions the defendant has been
imprisoned prior to the commission of such felony, and less than five years have elapsed
between the commission of such felony and either the defendant's release, or parole or
otherwise, from imprisonment for one such conviction or his commission of the last
such previous offense or another offense punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under applicable laws of the United States, a State, the District of Colum-
bia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or possession of the United States,
any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof; or
(2) the defendant committed such felony as part of a pattern of conduct which was
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he is charged, the court will conduct a special hearing on the question of
whether the defendant is in fact a "dangerous special offender." If such
special status is shown by a "preponderance of the information" the court
"shall" sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment "not to exceed
twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term
otherwise authorized by law for such felony." A special sentence so im-
posed may be appealed either by the defendant or by the government, but
the sentence so imposed may be increased only on an appeal taken by the
government and after a hearing.
There have been attacks leveled against Title X indicating that it is
violative of the constitutional requirement of due process and the prohibi-
tions against double jeopardy and vagueness. However, the judiciary has
long recognized that the same protections are not required in the sentenc-
ing process as in the process involved in the adjudication of guilt or in-
nocence. Thus, the threshold issue is raised. "Is charging a defendant
with being a "dangerous special offender" a charge of a separate criminal
offense?" If answered in the affirmative, the arguments presented by the
critics would be very persuasive. If answered in the negative, the argu-
ments would lose much of their force. However, the negative answer
would not foreclose absolutely a consideration of these constitutional argu-
ments.
One definition of crime points to the consequences of the proceeding
as they will affect the defendant's rights, and classifies as a crime that which
is followed by criminal penalties.14 A second definition of what consti-
tutes a crime says that if the procedures used are those typically associated
with a determination of criminal guilt, then that which they are employed
to determine, is a crime. 48 Since an expanded criminal penalty is the con-
sequence of being found to be a dangerous special offender, and the proce-
dures used are akin to those associated with a determination of criminal
guilt, one could argue that a finding as to special offender status may ac-
tually be denoting a crime. In addition, a few courts support the posi-
criminal under applicable law of any jurisdiction, which constituted a substantial source
of his income, and in which he manifested special skill or expertise; or
(3) such felony was, or the defendant committed such felony in furtherance of, a
conspiracy with three or more other persons to engage in a pattern of conduct criminal
under applicable laws of any jurisdiction, and the defendant did, or agreed that he
would, initiate, organize, plan, finance, direct, manage, or supervise all or part of such
conspiracy or conduct, or give or receive a bribe or use force as all or part of such con-
duct.
(f) A defendant is dangerous for purposes of this section if a period of con-
finement longer than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the
public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.
147 Pollock, What's in a Name? The Problem of the Definition of Crime, 1956 CalM.
L REV. 792.
148Williams, The Definition of Crime, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 107 (1955).
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tion that habitual offender statutes actually define a crime. A federal
district court in Application of Boyd'49 said:
It appears to the Court the sheerest verbalism to say that a defendant con-
victed of being a habitual criminal is not convicted of an offense but
merely fixed with a certain status, when the mandatory result of such con-
viction is life imprisonment without hope of parole.'-5
To sum up, the argument runs that since a determination of "dangerous
special offender" status is made for all intents and purposes in a criminal
proceeding, and since the penalty which follows the determination is a
criminal sanction, what then is to distinguish the status of dangerous spe-
cial offender from the crime of dangerous special offender?
The Supreme Court has previously considered the issue of whether
recidivist statutes delineate a separate offense. In Graham v. West Vir-
ginia,'l5 the Supreme Court viewed a recidivist determination as a distinct
issue and stated "... it does not relate to the commission of the offense,
but goes to the punishment only. . , The Court concluded that ".
there is no basis for the contention that the plaintiff in error has been put
in double jeopardy or that any of his privileges or immunities as a cti-
zen of the United States have been abridged."' 5  When the Supreme
Court again had an opportunity to consider West Virginia's habitual
criminal statute in Ofler v. Boles,'" the Court stated "... an habitual
criminal charge does not state a separate offense. . . ,,15 These prece-
dents would preclude further consideration on the question of whether the
recidivist definition of special offender actually defines a separate offense.
They would also appear to preclude further consideration as to the other
two definitions of special offender. Persuasive authority that all the def-
initions of special offender are not separate crimes or offenses is provided by
Specht v. Patterson.5' The case dealt with a defendant convicted of the
crime of indecent liberties under a Colorado statute that carried a maximum
sentence of ten years. However he was sentenced under the Sex Offenders
Act for an indeterminate term of from one day to life imprisonment. The
Act could be applied if the trial court believed that a person convicted of
specified sex offenses "if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to
members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill." There
the Court said:
The Sex Offenders Act does not make the commission of a specified crime
149 189 F. Supp. 113 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
150M., at 117.
151 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
152 Id. at 629.
153Id. at 631.
154 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
155Id. at 452.
150 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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the basis for sentencing. It makes one conviction the basis for com-
mencing another proceeding under another Act to determine whether a
person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is an habitual
offender and mentally ill. That is a new finding of fact... that was not an
ingredient of the offense charged.
Under Colorado's criminal procedure, here challenged, the invocation of
the Sex Offenders Act means the making of a new charge leading to
criminal punishment. The case is not unlike those under recidivist statutes
where an habitual criminal issue is a "distinct issue" (Graham v. West
Virginia . ..)15 (emphasis added).
The similarities of purpose and operation between the Sex Offenders Act
and Title X are apparent. Therefore, it is significant that the Supreme
Court noted the proceeding under the Sex Offenders Act is a separate pro-
ceeding to determine punishment and that Graham v. West Virginia was
cited in support of the notion that it is a "distinct issue." Although Gra-
ham v. West Virginia was cited to support the Court's contention in regard
to due process, it cannot be assumed that the Court overlooked the fact that
Graham stands for the notion that a habitual offender charge is not only a
distinct issue but also that ". . . it does not relate to the commission of
the offense, but goes to the punishment only. . . ."158 Thus, it would ap-
pear that Title X's definitions of special offender are not actually defining
a separate offense.
This conclusion would then mean that allowing the government to
appeal a decision of a district court that a defendant is not a "Dangerous
special offender" is not violative of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment. 150 However, the fact that "dangerous special offender" is
not a separate offense does not close the double jeopardy issue. It arises
in other contexts.
First, the professional offender and conspiracy offender definitions of
special offender employ the phrase, "pattern of conduct criminal under ap-
plicable laws of any jurisdiction." The phrase is further defined in the
Act as follows:
... criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have
the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events.160
It is not dear from the definition whether the reference to criminal acts is
limited to convictions. Since the recidivist definition specifically requires
prior "convictions," the absence of the word "conviction" from the "pat-
'57 Id. at 608-610.
158224 U.S. 616, 629 (1912).
159 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, ". . .nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."
160 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575 (Supp. 1971).
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tern" definition would indicate that Congress did not intend to limit crimi-
nal acts to convictions. Additionally, the Justice Department viewed this
definition as not being limited to convictions. In a letter to the Chairman
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Department wrote:
It is designed to reach the professional criminal who is a repeating of-
fender but who may not have a prior conviction record.' 16
If this is in fact what Congress intended, the problem is obvious. The
government would introduce evidence of prior criminal conduct not
amounting to convictions in support of its claim that the defendant is a
dangerous special offender. If the district court found that the "informa-
tion" 162 did not support the conclusion that the defendant had engaged in
prior criminal acts, the government, under Title X, would be allowed to
appeal this decision. The double jeopardy dause would be violated be-
cause, in effect, the government is being allowed to appeal a not guilty
finding as to prior offenses. These prior criminal acts can only be classified
as offenses as the use of the word "acts" suggests.
Additionally, allowing the government to show prior criminal acts not
amounting to convictions poses a problem in regard to the burden of proof
required. Since the government is attempting to show previous miscon-
duct in order to extend the defendant's prison term by showing criminal
acts for which there has been no prior conviction, it would seem that the
government should have to prove such beyond a reasonable doubt rather
than by a mere "preponderance of the information."'03
Second, the double jeopardy issue arises in the context of allowing
the government to appeal the length of the sentence imposed. The recent
Supreme Court decision in North Carolina v. Pearce'" appears to settle
this issue however. In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that there is no
constitutional prohibition against the imposition of a greater punishment
on a second trial following a successful appeal by a defendant than that
handed out on the first conviction. It should be noted that the Court was
dealing with an increase in sentence after retrial rather than on appeal
and that the Court required that the reasons for a higher sentence be based
on the defendant's objective conduct after the original sentencing so that
101 Letter from Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, to the Hon. Emanuel Cellar,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, September 9, 1970 as con-
tained in H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
102 18 U.S.C.A. § 3575(b) (Supp. 1971).
...If it appears by a preponderance of the information, including information sub-
mitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing and so much of the
presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a dangerous special
offender, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonmnt for an appropriate
term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maxi-
mum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony.
103r d.
104 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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there be no possibility of the defendant's being penalized for having taken
his appeal. This requirement would not be applicable to an increase in
length of sentence on appellate review under Title X because, unlike the
Pearce situation, under Title X, it is only the affirmative action of the gov-
ernment, not the defendant's exercise of a statutory right, that brings the
matter within the power of the appellate court to increase sentence length.
Just what difference there is in the fact that Pearce involved a retrial and
Title X involves an appeal remains to be decided. However, the distinc-
tion would appear to be one without a difference. Further, one of the
critics of the Senate version of the Organized Crime Control Act, The As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York, opined that the Pearce case
would allow a government appeal from the length of the sentence im-
posed.165 Another consideration that the courts should keep in mind is
the fact that many people are unhappy with the light sentences being
handed out by trial courts. Consider the recommendation of the Presi-
dent's Crime Commission that:
There must be some kind of supervision over those trial judges who,
because of corruption, political considerations, or lack of knowledge, tend
to mete out light sentences in cases involving organized crime manage-
ment personnel. Consideration should therefore be given to allowing the
prosecution the right of appeal regarding sentences of persons in manage-
ment positions in an organized crime activity or group.166
Another major problem that must be confronted in regard to Title X
deals with the issue of due process. It is apparent that Title X would
not meet the due process requirements for a proceeding wherein the guilt
or innocence as to a criminal offense is being determined. However, as
has been previously pointed out, judicial precedent would indicate that a
determination of "dangerous special offender" will not be regarded as a de-
termination of a separate crime or offense, but a determination as to pun-
ishment only. Therefore, the concern is over what constitutional protec-
tions are required in a sentencing proceeding under the dangerous special
offender provision. The issue centers around the facts that: (1) the trial
judge may base his finding on a presentence report which would contain
hearsay information; (2) the defendant may cross-examine only ".... such
witnesses as appear at the hearing;" and (3) "No limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and con-
duct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sen-
tence.1'167  The Supreme Court has previously held in Williams v. New
York 6 ' that the due process dause of the fourteenth amendment does not
165 A B C N Y REPORT 51 (1970).
16 6 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE ociETY 203 (1967).
167 18 U.S.C. § 3577.
168 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
[Vol. 32
NOTES
require that a person convicted be confronted with and permitted to cross-
examine witnesses when a judge is determining the sentence to be im-
posed. This would appear to settle the issue as to due process. However,
a more recent Supreme Court case, Specht v. Patterson,6" may be read to
require greater constitutional protections for a defendant involved in a
"dangerous special offender" proceeding. The Specbt case held that a per-
son committed under a state sex offenders act in a post conviction pro-
ceeding ". . . be confronted with witnesses against him, [and] have the
right to cross examine .... ,,170 Senator McClellan distinguishes the Specht
case with these words:
Specht is inapplicable to title X, since the post conviction allegations in
the Specht case were held to be a new charge, separate and distinct from
the criminal conviction which triggered the sex offender proceedings. In
title X, on the other hand, the dangerous special offender criteria are facts
which merely aggravate the penalty for an offense. 17'
However, as the New York City bar committee noted, under both the Sex
Offenders Act and the habitual criminal statutes, the same finding of fact
-that the defendant constitutes a threat to the public-has to be made
and the effect-additional incarceration-is the same.Y The Justice De-
partment, nonetheless, wrote:
It appears appropriate to distinguish between a proceeding which is based
upon a new and distinct criminal charge, and one in which an imposition
of an enhanced sentence is "a distinct issue."' 73
However, the Department failed to state why it is appropriate to make
this distinction. Further, it appears that the Specht case did not really
distinguish the two, but actually said they are "not unlike." 74
Although upholding the rule in the Williams case, the Court said:
We adhere to Williams v. New York, supra; but we decline the invitation
to extend it to this radically different situation. These commitment pro-
ceedings . . . are subject both to the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment ... and to the Due Process Clause.' 75
The Court did not specifically set out why the proceedings in Specht were
radically different. As pointed out above, the similarities in purpose and
effect in the Sex Offenders Act and Title X would indicate that Title X
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is also "radically different" in the very same way as the Sex Offenders Act
and therefore subject to the due process requirements set out in Specht.
In reference to the terms employed in the Senate version of Title X,
Senator McClellan argued that since Title X was not a substantive crimi-
nal prohibition but only a legislatively specified criteria for sentencing, it
need not have the specificity and preciseness required of substantive crimi-
nal statutes.176 However, Title X is unique in that it goes beyond the ordi-
nary sentencing procedure and different criteria are considered when de-
termining whether the defendant should have his liberty deprived for a
greater number of years. Since a defendant's liberty is likely to be deprived
for a greater number of years, it would seem then that the criteria used
to make this determination should be constitutionally precise. Support for
this notion is provided by the case of Minnesota v. Probate Court.7
There, a state statute provided that persons could be subjected to a proceed-
ing akin to lunacy proceedings with a view to restraint if the person was
proven to be a psychopathic personality. The statute, as construed by the
state court, called for evidence of "past conduct pointing to probable con-
sequences."178 The Supreme Court sustained the statute since "[t]his con-
struction of the statute destroys the contention that it is too vague and in-
definite to constitute valid legislation."'79 Implicit in this statement is
the notion that the commitment statute could not be vague or indefinite.
Logically, this same requirement would seem to be applicable to Title X.
Minnesota v. Probate Court would also indicate that some of the terms
employed in Title X are not vague. As Senator McClellan has pointed
out, Title X requires proof of past conduct by requiring that the defend-
ant is either a recidivist or has been engaged in a pattern of criminal con-
duct and it requires proof of "probable consequences" by requiring that
the defendant be found to be dangerous.8 0
The terms employed in the Senate version of Title X were criticized
for being vague.' 8 ' However the House amended the Title and included
some definitions suggested by the American Boys Assodation182 to make
more specific the terms, "Substantial source of income,". "in which he mani-
fested special skill or expertise," and "pattern of conduct."'18 Combining
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these expanded definitions with the case of Minnesota v. Probate Court
would lead one to conclude that the terms and definitions employed in
Title X are not unconstitutionally vague.
Title X presents another problem of constitutional dimensions in light
of the case of Robinson v. California.:' There the Supreme Court held
that a state statute which imprisons a person afflicted with narcotic addic-
tion inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment. There the Court was dealing
"... with a statute which makes the 'status' of narcotic addiction a crimi-
nal offense. ... "' Thus, the argument would run that being of the
status of a "dangerous special offender" would prevent the government from
imposing increased sentences. However, there are two reasons why it is
unlikely the Robinson rationale would apply to Title X. First, as it has
already been pointed out, judicial precedent would indicate that Title X
does not delineate a separate offense, but rather deals with sentencing
criteria only. Second, even if the "dangerous special offender" provision is
regarded as a separate offense, under Powell v. Texas 8 it is likely to be
upheld since proof as to past conduct is an additional requirement.
Another problem, not of a constitutional nature, but still of some major
significance deals with the discretion given the prosecutor in filing notice
as to special offender status. The statute provides that the attorney for
the United States may file such notice. It is not obligatory. This opens
up the possibilities for plea bargaining in the federal criminal process and
abuses by the federal prosecutors. Title X provides the prosecutor with a
useful tool to coerce guilty pleas out of those that may or may not fall
within the special offender class.
CONCLUSION
The Organized Crime Control Act provides the federal authorities
with effective and much needed tools to deal with the challenge of or-
ganized crime in our society. In seeking to balance the competing inter-
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ests of substantive rights and effective administration of justice, the Con-
gress has drafted the legislation well. In many respects, it is responsive to
the recommendations made by various legally oriented bodies. This is, of
itself, indicative that those provisions of the Act should pass constitutional
muster. However, there are some provisions that pose a threat of slight
impingement of constitutional rights and therefore are susceptible to being
rejected by the courts. But that is not enough of a reason to reject entirely
this innovative approach to criminal legislation taken by the Congress. It
cannot be forgotten that there is a need to eradicate the pervasiveness of
organized crime and the Organized Crime Control Act provides the means.
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